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FOREWORD
READING CHARLES BLACK WRITING:
"THE LAWFULNESS OF THE SEGREGATION
DECISIONS" REVISITED
Kendall Thomas

The year 2010 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the
publication of Charles L. Black, Jr.'s "The Lawfulness of the
Segregation Decisions."' Professor Black's magisterial essay on the
Supreme Court's 1954-1955 decisions in Brown v. Board of Education2
and its companion cases is, by any account, a foundational text in
the scholarly literature on race and law in the United States. Black's
short but searing defense of Brown introduced ideas and arguments
about race, about law, and about the law of race that transformed
the field. I can think of no better way to celebrate this inaugural
issue of the Columbia Journal of Race and Law than to revisit "The
Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions," and to highlight the
continuing significance, a half century later, of Charles Black's
intellectual preoccupations and practice for the project to which the
Editors of this journal have devoted its pages: the critical study of
race and law.
I first encountered "The Lawfulness of the Segregation
Decisions" in the spring of 1980, as one of a small group of Yale
Law students who had the good fortune to study with Charles Black
Nash Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69
YALE. L.J. 421 (1960) [hereinafter Black, Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions].
The year 2010 is the thirtieth anniversary of another transformative moment in
the history of American race law scholarship: the publication of Derrick Bell's
"Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma."
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARv. L. REv. 518 (1980). I dedicate this Foreword to Professor
Bell, with admiration, affection, and gratitude for the generosity of his example
as a scholar, teacher, and mentor.
2 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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in his seminar "Constitutional Law Revisited." Among the assigned
texts that semester was the manuscript, in galley proof, of Professor
Black's 1979 Holmes Lectures, which would appear in 1981 under
the title Decision According to Law. I can still recall vividly a passage in
the manuscript that, as I read it, seemed almost to leap from its
page:
Language is the linseed oil of law. We have to use
linseed oil in painting; when exposed to air it hardens to
a nearly transparent substance that holds in place for
centuries the very molecules of pigment that were in the
mess smeared on. But it yellows, it cracks, and it peels
rather badly, sometimes, however careful you are, and
quite badly, much of the time, if you are not careful. In
one way or another law not only uses language, but may
be said only to exist in language; the dangers of language
are dangers to law. 3
"Law . . . may be said only to exist in language." From one
perspective, these words stand as a summary statement of one of the
most salient thematic strands in Charles Black's incomparable
scholarly corpus. This is not to suggest that the author of Structure
and Relationshj in ConstitutionalLaw was a "textualist," at least not in
the sense lawyers have typically tended to understand that concept.4
I mean, rather, to make two broader, different points. The first
point is that Black's abiding interest in the concurrent jurisdiction of
language and law, in the imbrication and interdependence of law and
language, was driven by his intuition that no deep insight into the
epistemic, ontological or normative dimensions of legal thought and
practice is possible without attending to the question of law's
literatiness. To adapt a claim Richard Rorty famously made about the
practice of philosophy, Charles Black invites his readers to consider,
or, more precisely, to consider as they experience, the ways in which
3 CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW 22 (1981)

[hereinafter BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW].
4 I do not mean to imply that Black's analysis of constitutional
structure and relationship was indifferent to claims of the text. Black denied
that the structural method entailed "the total abandonment of the method of
particular-text interpretation." Rather, Black posited "a close and perpetual
interworking between the textual and the relational and structural modes of
reasoning, for the structure and relations concerned are themselves created by
the text, and inferences drawn from them must surely be controlled by the
text." CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 31 (1969) [hereinafter BLACK, STRUCTURE AND
RELATIONSHIP].
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law and legal thinking represent a kind of writing.5 Even when it is
not explicitly theorized, the question of how and why language
matters in, and for, law is a recurring concern in Black's work.
Consider, for example, in this connection, the textual strategy of
Structure and Relationshjo, in which Black provocatively deploys the
literary image and idea of "juristic style" as a substitute for more
conventional "technicist" terminology such as "legal reasoning,"
"analysis," "argument" or "method" and so on. 6
A second, related point is that Professor Black's alertness to
the discursive dimensions of law shaped not only how he thought
about law, but the terms and techniques he used to write about it.
"The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions" is an exemplary, and
enviable, instance of Black's mastery of the elements of scholarly
style. The persuasive power of his defense of Brown and its
companion cases derives not only from its legal reasoning, but from
its rhetorical register, or, to use another of his preferred terms, from
the "modes" 7 of language use through which that reasoning is
articulated and advanced.
This can be seen, for example, in the modal mastery with
which Black frames his response to the contention that the regime
of state-mandated racial segregation is not necessarily hostile to the
equality norm of the Fourteenth Amendment. Black asks:
[D]oes segregation offend against equality? Equality,
like all general concepts, has marginal areas where
philosophic difficulties are encountered. But if a whole
race of people finds itself confined within a system
which is set up and continued for the very purpose of
keeping it in an inferior station, and if the question is
then solemnly propounded whether such a race is being
treated "equally," I think we ought to exercise one of
the sovereign prerogatives of philosophers-that of
laughter. The only question remaining (after we get our
5 Richard Rorty, Philosophy as a Kind of Writing: An Essay on Derrida,in
CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (ESSAYS: 1972-1980) 90 (1982).
6 See, e.g., BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP, supra note 4, at 3

(describing structural and relational analysis as a "stylistic preference"); id. at 10
(characterizing the particular-text method as the standard "American juristic
style"); id. at 11 (specifying the "stylistic, or if you like, methodological
difference" between textual and structural legal arguments).

7 BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW,
41, 73.

supra note 3, at 17, 23, 31,
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laughter under control) is whether the segregation
system answers to this description.8
To state the claim another way, the force of the argument in
"The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions" inheres not only in
the substance of the ideas it advances, but in the tone and texture of
its individual sentences. The essay thus inhabits a genre of legal
writing that strains against the limits of the conventional boundaries
between prose and poetry, between literal and figurative uses of
language, between analytic and literary discourse.
It would be a mistake, though, to see Black's project in
narrowly or conventionally aesthetic terms. His interest in styles of
legal argument and analysis was most certainly not a matter of mere
ornamentalism. Rather, Black's vision of the "art"9 of law derives
from a recognition that "aesthetic choices" have significant and
pragmatic effect in the real world of legal practice.10 His work
demonstrates that a legal scholar's aesthetic choices are often also
ethical choices. The style of the "Lawfulness" essay strives to
"create a textuality and distinctive discourse [whose] material
force" 11 reflects the author's deep ethical commitment to a certain
way of thinking as a legal intellectual about the African American
freedom movement as a problem in and for our constitutional
jurisprudence.
As is well known, "The Lawfulness of the Segregation
Decisions" was, as Black put it, a partial response 2 to the critical
appraisal of Brown offered by our late Columbia Law School
colleague Herbert Wechsler. In "Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law," 13 published the year before "The Lawfulness
of the Segregation Decisions," Professor Wechsler advanced a
vision of judicial review and its justification that would come to
define the agenda of U.S. constitutional scholarship for decades to
come. As Derrick A. Bell, Jr. has written, Wechsler's demonstrated
professional commitment to the cause of Black civil rights and his
stated support for the result reached by the Court made it difficult
8

Black, Lawfulness of Segregation Deisions,supranote 1, at 424.

9 Id. at 429.
10

Id. at 428.

11CORNEL

WEST, PROPHESY DELIVERANCE!:
AFRO-AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY 15 (1982).

A REVOLUTIONARY

Black, Lawfulness of Segregation Dedsions, supranote 1, at 421 n.3.
Herbert Wechsler, Toward NeutralPrindzles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73
HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959). "Neutral Principles" was the published text of the
1959 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture at Harvard Law School.
12

13
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to dismiss his "sharp and nagging criticism" of Brown as an instance
of "after the fact faultfinding by a conservative academician." 14
For Wechsler, "the main constituent of the judicial process"
was "that it must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to
every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and
reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved."15
A judge may be said to have given a neutral reason, in Wechsler's
sense, if that judge "states a basis for a decision that [she or he]
would be willing to follow in other situations to which it applies." 16
Conceptually speaking, the neutrality of the decisional rule is a
function of its generality, or, if you will, of its transitivi_*. In its moral
dimension, the principle of neutrality amounts to a kind of
"indifference principle"1 7: A judicial decision is legitimate from
Wechsler's perspective only to the extent that the rule of law it
announces and applies in no way turns on the identity and interests
of the particular parties before the court.' 8 Politically, the neutral
principles idea is a normative thermometer with which to measure
the institutional legitimacy of specific assertions by the judiciary of
its power to review and invalidate contested uses of legislative and
executive power.
Wechsler contended that the Supreme Court's decision in
Brown and its companion cases simply failed to pass the test of
neutral principles. According to Wechsler, the "problem" with the
reasoning in Brown inhered in the Court's evident view that "racial
segregation is, in principle, a denial of equality to the minority
against whom it is directed; that is, the group that is not dominant
politically and, therefore, does not make the choice involved."1 9 As
Wechsler saw it, this proposition could not be considered a "neutral
principle" of constitutional law. First, the Court's conclusion
appeared to "involve an inquiry into the motive of the legislature,
which is generally foreclosed to the courts." 20 Second, and more
fundamentally, the Court seemed to have adopted the interpretation
given to the racial segregation law at issue in Brown by the African
14 Bell, supra note 1, at 520.
15 Weschsler, supra note 13, at 15.

16Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Signficance of Neutral Princples, 78
COLUM. L. REv. 982, 985 (1978).
17 See Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of
Interpretivism and Neutral Prinles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 805 (arguing that
Wechsler's theory "characterizes neutrality as judicial indifference to who the
winner is").
18 Wechsler, supranote 13, at 12-14.
19 Id. at 33.
20

Id
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Americans "who [were] affected by it."21
In this connection,
Wechsler asked rhetorically:
"In the context of a charge that
segregation with equal failities is a denial of equality, is there not a
point in Plessy in the statement that if 'enforced separation stamps
the colored race with a badge of inferiority' it is solely because its
members choose 'to put that construction upon it'?"22
Wechsler maintained that the "human and constitutional
dimensions" 23 of state-enforced racial segregation had nothing to do
with the concept of discrimination, which he rather narrowly
defined as formally unequal treatment. Rather, at stake in Brown
were two competing claims about the freedom of association, whose
denial (or recognition) by the state "impinges in the same way on
any groups or races that may be involved." 24 Seen in these terms,
suggested Wechsler, there was no neutral, principled justification (or
at least none he could see) for the Court's decision in Brown to
disturb the decision by some states and their legislatures not to force
"an association [in public schools] upon those for whom it is
unpleasant or repugnant." 25
The heart of Professor Wechsler's negative appraisal of
Brown is his expressed doubt that the judgment in Brown "really
turned upon the facts." 26 Paradoxically, Wechsler's skepticism about
the "factual" foundations of the Court's decision in Brown itself rests
on a set of equally contestable assumptions about the lived
experience of racial segregation. The philosopher Charles Mills has
noted that in the scholarly discourse on race and racism (as in other
fields of intellectual inquiry), "factual questions" in the form of
"low-level empirical assertions" or more "abstract theoretical
claims" nearly always play some role in "normative disputes." 27 The
precise nature of these empirical and theoretical assumptions, and
the degree to which they are explicitly identified and defended as
such depends in significant part on the "thought style," if you will,
of the scholar in question. By "thought style" I mean to refer to the
"complex milieu" of a thinker's expert or "esoteric" knowledge and
Id
Id. (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896)).
23 Id. at 34.
24 Id
25 Id
26 Id. at 33.
27 Charles W. Mills, The RacialPoliy, in RACISM AND PHILOSOPHY
13,
17 (Susan E. Babbitt & Sue Campbell eds., 1999).
21

22
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the common or "exoteric" knowledge to which she or he has access
by virtue of belonging to the society in which she or he lives. 28
An alternative conceptual term for conveying the
determinate force of scholarly "thought styles" is literary scholar
Raymond Williams' notion of "structures of feeling." 29 Williams
invokes the terms "structure of feeling" and "structures of
experience" to denote what, on his account, is a central component
of intellectual work. For Williams, "structures of feeling" or
"structures of experience" refer not only to formalizable or
"formally held and systematic beliefs," but to the broader
constellation of human ideas and imaginings as they are "actively
lived and felt."30
In Williams' words, "we are talking about
characteristic elements of impulse, restraint and tone; specifically
affective elements of consciousness and relationships: not feeling
againstthought, but thought asfelt andfeeling."31 The crucial point here is
that these elements of "thought as felt and feeling" are not
incidental to, but immanent in intellectual practice. They are both
the source and site of an unarticulated or even inarticulable "social
imaginary," 32 made up of the intuitions and tacit understandings that
give focus and form to intellectual work. "Thought styles" or
"structures of feeling" frame the boundaries of the questions
scholars choose to ask, and fix the boundaries of the answers they
find.
One element of Wechsler's "thought style" in "Neutral
Principles" is rendered most vividly toward the end of the
discussion of the Court's recent race jurisprudence. Describing
what he takes to be the essential error of the Supreme Court's
decision in Brown, Wechsler writes:
For me, assuming equal facilities, the question posed by
state-enforced segregation is not one of discrimination
at all. Its human and constitutional dimensions lie
entirely elsewhere, in the denial by the state of the
freedom to associate, a denial that impinges in the same
way on any groups or races that may be involved. 33
28 LUDWIK FLECK, THE
SCIENTIFIC FACT 125-42 (Thaddeus

GENESIS

J. Trenn

AND

DEVELOPMENT

OF A

& Robert K. Merton eds., Fred

Bailey & Thaddeus J. Trenn trans., 1979).
29 RAYMOND WILLIAMS, MARXISM AND LITERATURE 132 (1977).
30

Id

31 Id. (emphasis added).
32 CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES

33 Wechsler, supra note 13, at 34 (emphasis added).

(2004).
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Note the explicit assumption here, as though it were a "material"
fact, that the state-mandated segregation challenged in Brown had to
do with "equal facilities." I shall have more to say shortly about the
nature and implications of the posited factual foundation on which
Wechsler erects his normative case against Brown.
I want to focus for the moment on another factual premise
that drives the thesis Wechsler is arguing here, which is never stated
explicitly. This more abstract, non-empirical "theoretical" fact,
whose implicit assumption is central to Wechsler's critical
reformulation of the issue in Brown, has to do with the "cultural
geography" of segregation.
Let me explain what I mean. As we have seen, "Toward
Neutral Principles" argues that Brown is best understood as a case
about conflicting assertions of associational rights. What Wechsler's
analysis never makes entirely clear, however, is why the public
character of public school education could not provide a principled
basis for a constitutional conclusion that the right to associate and
the right not to associate need not always and in every instance be
considered "human claims" of equally "high dimension." 34 The point
I am stressing here-a point that Wechsler's associational rights
theory entirely overlooks-is that this critique of Brown makes sense
only from the perspective of a cultural geography in which the
public and private spheres are not merely connected and
continuous, but in some important if unspecified sense,
indistinguishable.
Now, the public-private distinction is a conceptual couplet
that would have made any mid-twentieth century constitutional law
scholar's shortlist of "foundational ideas in American legal
thought."35 Wechsler's silence about its implications for Brown and
the other school segregation cases is curious, to say the least. This
failure to reckon with the public-private distinction is particularly
telling given Wechsler's explicit and extended engagement with
issues of privacy, publicity and neutrality in his hard-hitting critical
34

Id

35 The modem legal scholarship on the public-private distinction is,

of course, voluminous. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court: 1966
Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and Cakfornia'sProposition 14, 81
HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967); Henry J. Friendly, The Public-Private PenumbraFourteen Years Later, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1289 (1982); Duncan Kennedy, The
Stages of Decline of the Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982);
Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private
Distinction, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 319 (1993); Larry Alexander, The Public/
PrivateDistinction and ConstitutionalLimits on PrivatePower, 10 CONST. COMMENT.
361 (1993).
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assessment of the Court's decisions in the "white primary" and
racially restrictive covenant cases 36-a discussion which appears in
the very same section of "Neutral Principles" that concludes with
the famous critique of Brown.
Wechsler ends his overview of the Court's decisions in the
"white primary" and restrictive covenant cases by conceding the
existence of private "power aggregates in our society" which
"[wield] in many areas more power than the government" (his
example is the large business corporadon).37 He nevertheless rejects
the argument that this modern understanding of the public
dimensions and consequences of private power justifies judicial
imposition of constitutional norms on non-state actors such as
political parties (as the Supreme Court did by invalidating "white
primaries") or parties to residential real estate transactions (as the
Court did in striking down racially restrictive covenants).
For Wechsler, such questions as whether and when the
Constitution should consider private, civic power in the same light
as public, state power were not questions of law but questions of
policy that entailed the identification and choice of "values," a term
that takes on outsized importance in his analysis. The judge who
reached a decision based on "value judgments" about such matters
of policy would be "drawing lines that courts are not equipped to
draw." 38 The power of judicial review could remain legitimate only
so long as the judges who held it respected the difference between
the "exercise of reason" and mere "acts of willfulness or will." 39 A
court that took upon itself the essentially legislative or executive task
of choosing among "competing values or desires" 40 was not acting
as a "court of law," but as a "naked power organ."4 1
The Brown decision's "appraisal of conflicting values" could
not be deemed truly "judicial" 42 because the Court was insufficiently
in djfferent to the interests and identities of the parties before it:
I find it hard to think the judgment [in Brown] really
turned upon the facts. Rather, it seems to me, it must
have rested on the view that racial segregation is, in
principle, a denial of equality to the minority against
Wechsler, supra note 13, at 26-35 & nn.83-120.
37 Id. at 31.
36

38

39
40
41
42

Id.
Id at 11.
Id
Id. at 12, 19.
Id. at 16.
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whom it is directed; that is, the group that is not
dominant politically and, therefore, does not make the
choice involved. 43
For Wechsler, more than anything else, this perceived lack of
obedience to the requirements of the "indifference principle"
explained the Brown Court's failure to justify its decision in terms
that rose to the level of a "result transcendent" principle that he and
other proponents of process theory took to be the hallmark of the
legal reasoning, and indeed, of the rule of law as such.44
In a sense, the assumptive axis on which Wechsler's
associational rights theory of the Brown decision turns is not the
"assuming" of segregated but equal facilities, but the "assuming
away" of the differences between public and private social space,
and between public and private cultural institutions and practices.
As a consequence, "Neutral Principles" neither asks nor addresses
the question of whether a "genuinely principled" constitutional
distinction can in fact be drawn between associational claims in the
intimate domain of private life, on one side, and averred rights of
association in the impersonal arenas of public life, on the other.
Wechsler's unacknowledged and unremarked elision of privacy and
publicity simply takes the public-private distinction off the table,
preempting its potential use as a critical resource for meeting the
"challenge" 45 of writing an opinion that could survive the
associational rights critique of Brown and the other school
segregation decisions.
In stark contrast to Wechsler, Charles Black makes it clear
from the outset that he takes the pertinence of the public-private
distinction to be basic and axiomatic for understanding the issues in
Brown. "The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions" draws on the
distinction to open up what Wechsler's analysis preemptively shuts
down. Black's account of what was at stake in Brown never loses
sight of the differences between privacy and publicity, in both their
descriptive and normative dimensions. Leaning heavily on the
public side of the public-private distinction, Black helps us
understand the full implications of Wechsler's allegadon that no
"neutral" constitutional justification exists for holding that the Brown
plaintiffs' claims for association should prevail over the defendants'
43 Id. at 33.
4 Id. at 15 ("I put it to you that the main constituent of the judicial
process is precisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to
every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite
transcending the immediate result that is achieved.").
45 Id. at 34.
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claims against association. For Black, Wechsler's associational
theory of the case is in effect an argument that no constitutionally
compelling case can be made for preferring "the Negroes' desire for
merged participation in public life to the white man's desire to live a
public lfe without Negroes in proximity."4 6 As Black sees it, a white
American who asserts that she or he has a right not to associate with
Black Americans is claiming a freedom that can be said to exist only
in the privacy of that white American's home: "[I]n public, we have
to associate with anybody who has a right to be there. The question
of our right not to associate with him is concluded when we decide
whether he has a right to be there."4 7
What accounts for the radical difference in premise and
perspective between the accounts that Herbert Wechsler and
Charles Black give of Brown? I would like to sketch briefly one
possible answer, which connects the question of the public-private
distinction to the earlier mentioned notion of intellectual "thought
styles." 48 I have in mind here the different ways Wechsler and Black
"imagine" the world of segregation, and how these different ways of
imagining segregation find expression in the language each scholar
uses to write about segregation law. 49
The reader of "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law" cannot help but note the mastery with which Wechsler
mobilizes the terms of "analytic" legal discourse, his complete
command of the rhetorical language of "postulates," "deduction,"
"principle," "judgment" and, above all, of "reason," "reasons,"
"styles of reasoning" and "reasoned exposidon."50 Not surprisingly,
these same rhetorical figures organize the argument in "The
46Black, Lawfulness of Segregation Decisions, supra note 1, at 428
(emphasis added).
47 Id. at 429.
48 See supranote 28 and accompanying text.
49 In contrasting the discursive styles of Charles Black and Herbert
Wechsler, I do not wish to be understood as suggesting that the language of
"Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law" is not rhetorical (whatever
that might possibly mean). The distinction I am making here has to do with
the different rhetorical strategies of the two writers. In broad terms, we might
say that Black's defense of Brown proceeds through a "rhetoric of meaning"
and Wechsler's critique of Brown through a "rhetoric of persuasion." A
thoughtful rhetorical account of the text of "Neutral Principles" can be found
in Jane B. Baron and Julia Epstein, Is Law Narrative?, 45 BUFF. L. REv. 141,
151-58 (1997).
50 See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 13, at 19 ("A principled decision, in
the sense I have in mind, is one that rests on reasons with respect to all the
issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend
any immediate result that is involved.").
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Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions." On the very first page of
the essay, Black describes the "simple syllogism" which, for him,
forms the "basic scheme of reasoning" that justifies the decisions in
Brown and its companion cases:
First, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment should be read as saying that the Negro
race, as such, is not to be significantly disadvantaged by
the laws of the states. Secondly, segregation is a massive
intentional disadvantaging of the Negro race, as such, by
state law.51
As a rhetorical matter, this "conceptual" or "propositional" line of
argument tracks the terms in which Wechsler presents the "neutral
principles" thesis to which Black is responding.
However, this "analytic" discourse is accompanied and
eventually eclipsed by another, very different rhetorical strategy,
which emphasizes ideas and images that have to do with the meaning
of segregation, and of segregation law. Black early on characterizes
the claim that Brown and its companion cases were wrongly decided
as a "call for action" which carries pragmatic "meaning" and
"significance." 52 Elsewhere, Black stresses the extent to which his
understanding of the constitutional issues raised in Brown derives not
so much from abstract "reasoning" as from a situated "reading" (the
term is Black's own) of the "social meaning of segregation," 53 of
"what segregation means to the people who impose it and to the
people who are subjected to it."54
In another part of the essay, Black argues that a fair
constitutional assessment of the laws challenged in Brown must
consider the "total social meaning and impact" 55 of the larger
"functioning complex"5 6 of "indisputably and grossly discriminatory
[practices]" 5 7 to which those individual laws belong. Finally, in the
essay's most direct engagement with the "neutral principles" idea,
Black insists that "it would be the most unneutral of principles" to
require a court grappling with the legal issues presented in Brown to
ignore a "plain fact" about American society in the middle of the
twentieth century:
namely, "the fact that the social meaning of
51 Black, Lawfulness of Segregation Decisions, supranote 1, at 421.

54

Id
Id. at 424.
Id. at 426 (emphasis added).

5s

Id. (emphasis added).

56

Id. at 425.

52

53

57 Id.
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segregation is the putting of the Negro in a position of walled-off
inferiority-or the other equally plain fact that such treatment is
hurtful to human beings."58
Black's preoccupation with the cultural meaning of racial
segregation presses focus on the semiotic dimension of that human
social practice. Moreover, in stressing the value and validity of
attending to the meaning of segregation, Black can be read as
making a similar, but distinct point about the semiotics of
segregation law. Black intimates that the "active [labor] of making
[race] mean"59 was a unique feature of the legal apparatus Southern
states devised to enforce Jim Crow's disciplinary regime, above and
beyond its purely instrumental uses. Although he demonstrates the
point more than he explicitly argues it, Black suggests that this
"signifying" dimension of the rules of segregation law-what I have
been calling that law's semiotic function-must be deemed
constitutionally significant precisely in virtue of its power to "create
social meaning and thus shape social worlds." 60
In emphasizing the cultural or social meanings of
segregation and segregation law, Black cuts the theoretical ground
out from under one of Wechsler's chief objections to Brown. Gary
Peller has noted that for Wechsler, the central defect of the Brown
opinion lay in the Court's willingness to accept the "subjective
interpretation" of segregation law as it appeared from the vantage
point of the African Americans who "chose" to view it as racial
discrimination.61 A "neutral" and "principled" analysis of the law
challenged in Brown "would make the constitutional determination
turn on the objective character of the legislation itself." 62
Black's emphasis on the social meaning of segregation
provides a critical compass for navigating between the twin poles of
"subjectivity" and "objectivity" that anchor Wechsler's perspective.
Black displaces the terms of the argument "Neutral Principles"
presses against Brown, practicing what might be called an intersubjective
58

Id. at 427 (emphasis added).

59 I am claiming here with respect to the language of racial
segregation law what Stuart Hall has suggested is true of all linguistic
representation. Stuart Hall, The Rediscovery of 'Tdeology": Return of the Repressed in
Media Studies, in CULTURE, SOCIETY AND THE MEDIA 64 (M. Gurevitch et al.

eds., 1982).
60 David Garland, Punishment and Culture: The Symbolic Dimensions of
CriminalJustice, 11 STUD. L. POL. & SOC. 191, 193 (1991).
61 Gary Peller, NeutralPrincilesin the 1950s, 21 U. MiCH. J.L. REFORM
561, 606 (1988).
62 Id
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interpretive theory of segregation and segregation law. 63 On the one
hand, Black's "reading" of the "social meaning of segregation" does
not hesitate to refer to the "individual text" of his own personal
experience of segregation growing up in Austin, Texas. 64 However,
Black's account of what and how segregation signifies does not limit
itself to the "subjectively obvious." 65 He draws as well on the
intersubjective "social text" provided by the "public materials" 66 of
history, common culture, linguistic convention, social custom, and
the legal system itself
"Segregation in the South," Black reminds us, is a regime
that "comes down in apostolic succession from slavery and the Dred
Scott case." 67 "The movement for segregation," he writes, "was an
integral part of the movement to maintain and further 'white
supremacy"' 68
The mutuality of segregation is a myth:
"[Segregation] was imposed on one race by the other race; consent
was not invited or required." 69 The asymmetrical racial power and
desire that gave birth to Jim Crow are what continue to nourish it:
"Segregation in the South grew up and is kept going because and
only because the white race has wanted it that way-an
incontrovertible fact which in itself hardly consorts with equality."70
"When you are in Leeville and hear someone say 'Leeville High,' you
know he has reference to the white high school; the Negro school
will be called something else-Carver High, perhaps, or Lincoln
High to our shame." 7 '
Importantly, Black references the active and ongoing role
law has played in creating and sustaining the public, social meanings
of segregation:
Southern courts ... have held that the placing of a white

person in a Negro railroad car is an actionable
humiliation .... It is actionable defamation in the South
63

In this regard, Black's approach anticipates (by nearly thirty years)

the "cultural meaning test" Charles Lawrence III has developed for addressing
the problem of "unconscious" racism. Charles Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego,
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317

(1987).

69

Black, Lawfulness of Segregation Dedsions, supranote 1, at 424.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)).
Id. at 424-25.
Id. at 425.
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Id
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Id.

64
65
66
67
68

15

READING CHARLES BLACK WRITING

Vol. 1:1

to call a white man a Negro. A small proportion of
Negro "blood" puts one in the inferior race for
segregation purposes; this is the way in which one deals
with a taint, such as a carcinogene in cranberries. 72
The great strength of Black's theory of cultural meaning
resides in its resolute refusal to consign the subjective side of social
relations to the margins of legal discourse. Evidence of the way
segregation law "is interpreted by those who are affected by it"73 (in
Wechsler's formulation) is not presumptively or prematurely
foreclosed as a ground for judicial decision, but is tested and
confirmed-in Black's terms "backed up"-by putting those
subjective interpretations in conversation with the shared,
intersubjective meanings conveyed by "more public materials." 74
If the "cultural meaning" of segregation forms the first
conceptual fulcrum on which "The Lawfulness of the Segregation
Decisions" pivots its defense of Brown, the "material culture" of
segregation forms the second. By "material culture," I mean simply
to refer to the lfeworld or the everyday life of racial segregation.
In my view, the significance of Black's interest in the
"material culture" of Jim Crow is perhaps best appreciated by
connecting it to his distinct disinterest in what he rather dismissively
describes as the "metaphysical" question of whether segregation
must always and everywhere amount to discrimination. He writes:
That is an interesting question; someday the methods of
sociology may be adequate to answering it. But it is not
our question. Our question is whether discrimination
inheres in that segregation which is imposed by law in
the twentieth century in certain specific states in the
American Union. And that question has meaning and
can find an answer only on the ground of history and of
common knowledge about the facts of life in the times
and places aforesaid.7 5
For Black, questions about the discriminatory meaning, purpose and
effects of segregation law can be answered only by reference to
concrete, specific and material facts, whose content or character
must not be assumed, but established.
Id. at 427, 426.
73 Wechsler, supranote 13, at 33.
74 Black, Lawfulness of Segregation Decisions, supranote 1, at 424.
75 Id. at 427.
72
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One of the things that made "The Lawfulness of the
Segregation Decisions" such an event in the history of public law
scholarship is the force and the forcefulness with which Black
attacks the central factual premise on which Wechsler and others
had based their critiques of Brown. This, of course, was the
contention (a contention, it must be noted, which found support in
the language of the Brown Court's opinion) that the South's legally
segregated public facilities were, or, more precisely, were being
made, equal as a matteroffact.
The middle section of "The Lawfulness of the Segregation
Decisions" painstakingly demonstrates why the assumed material
equality of racial segregation is a "fiction" that "is just about on a
level with the fiction of 'finding' in the action of trover."7 6 Black
utterly and unapologetically demolishes the notion that a useful
answer to the question of what segregation and segregation law
mean can be derived from a fictional facticity that assumes away the
realities of "a system which, in all that can be measured, has
practiced the grossest inequality."77
Several points might be made about the discursive strategy
Black follows in describing the inequalities that pervade what I have
been calling the "material culture" of the "segregation system" as it
"is actually conceived" and as it "actually funcdon[s]."78 I will
confine myself to a single observation. At one point, Black quickly
catalogs the many inequities that typically go unnoticed and
unmentioned in discussions of the Plesy decision's doctrine of
"separate but equal":
"Separate but equal" facilities are almost never really
equal. Sometimes this concerns small things-if the
"white" men's room has mixing hot and cold taps, the
"colored" men's room will likely have separate taps; it is
always the back of the bus for the Negroes; "Lincoln
Beach" will rarely if ever be as good as the regular
beach. Sometimes it concerns the most vital mattersthrough the whole history of segregation, colored
schools have been so disgracefully inferior to white
schools that only ignorance can excuse those who have
remained acquiescent members of a community that
76
7
78

Id. at 424.
Id. at 426.
Id. at 430.
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lived the Molochian child-destroying lie that put them
forward as "equal."7 9
Black's granular description of the everyday inequalities that
characterize the material culture of segregation offers the prose
equivalent of pointillist perspective. However, he takes care to insist
that these inequalities not be focused on "as things in themselves,"80
but as the mise-en-scane for a kind of regional social theater. The
material culture of segregation sets the stage for a command
performance in which blacks are forced to act out the "unwritten
law" of the South's racial regime "as to job opportunities, social
intercourse, patterns of housing, going to the back door, being
called by the first name, saying 'Sir,' and all the rest of the whole
sorry business." 81
The image of the material culture of Southern segregation
that Black gives us here (and this is the point I want to stress) is an
image of a public that utterly escapes the optic of Wechsler's account
of Brown. Black's insistence on the public character and meaning of
racial segregation is interwoven with his equally emphatic insistence
that segregation is not a set of discrete and disconnected practices
but a "system." 82 The picture of the public, material culture of
segregation and segregation law depicted in "The Lawfulness of the
Segregation Decisions" illuminates aspects of the lifeworld of the
South that the essentially "privative" perspective of "Neutral
Principles" hides from view.
Consider in this regard the critical light Black's account of
the public culture of segregation law sheds on the image of
segregation that informs an argument Wechsler makes in the final
paragraphs of "Neutral Principles." This is the claim that a state's
denial of the freedom to associate is a "denial that impinges in the
same way on any groups or races that may be involved." 83 To
support his argument, Wechsler anecdotally recounts his own
personal experience of segregation. Wechsler famously recalls that
"[in] the days when I was joined with Charles H. Houston in a
litigation in the Supreme Court, before the present building was
constructed, he did not suffer more than I in knowing that we had
to go to Union Station to lunch together during recess." 84
79 Id. at
80 Id. at
81Id. at
82 Id. at

425-26.
426.
425.
426, 427, 430.

83

Wechsler, supranote 13, at 34 (emphasis added).
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Id.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW

2011

18

Wechsler clearly has not taken the full measure of the
distance that separated his "knowledge" and his "suffering" from
that of Charles Hamilton Houston, the celebrated African American
lawyer. Wechsler seems oblivious to the different positions he and
Houston occupied in the larger landscape of racial segregation. The
two men were in important respects "dissimilarly situated," and thus
could not in fact have been affected "in the same way" by their
shared experience of segregation's material culture. Wechsler's
"thought style" lacks the resources for "imagining" the racial
specificity, the singularity of Houston's "subjective" experience as a
"subject" of racial segregation, that is, as someone who (to quote
Black) was "subjected to it."ss He accordingly fails to make (or
consider the meaning of) the connections between his recollected
experience of two individuals of different "races" who were denied
the right to break bread in public and the experience of "a whole
race of people" 86 who are denied the right to participate fully and
equally "in the generalpubliclife of the community."87
One reason Charles Black finds it so "hard to make out
what is being protested against when it is asked, rhetorically, how
the Court can possibly advise itself of the real character of the
segregation system"88 is because of the way he imagines race and
racism in U.S. law and society. His imagination enlarges his critical
perspective, leading him to language that illuminates the nested or
mutually constitutive relationship between politics and society,
between civil and civic life, between public culture and publicfreedom:
Here we have two things. First, a certain group of
people is "segregated." Secondly, at about the same time,
the very same group of people, down to the last man
and woman, is barred, or sought to be barred, from the
common political life of the community-from all
political power.89
Black, Lawfulness of Segregation Dedsions, supra note 1, at 426
(emphasis added). It is this moment in "Neutral Principles" which, more than
any other, persuades me that Gary Peller is exactly right when he argues that
legal process theory, of which Wechsler was such a prominent proponent, is
most "accurately understood as the cultural ideology through which
mainstream, predominantly white, male, and economically secure American
intellectuals in the post-War period filtered their perception of their social
environment." Peller, supra note 61, at 621.
86 Black, Lawfulness of Segregation Dedsions, supranote 1, at 424.
87 Id. at 426 (emphasis added).
88 Id. at 427.
89 Id. at 425 (emphasis added).
85

19

READING CHARLES BLACK WRITING

Vol. 1:1

The predominant idea-image here is one of state-enforced racial
segregation as a "functioning complex"90 that is a condominium of
cultural power and political power, of cultural power as political
power, of "one in-group enjoying full normal communal life" and a
second "out-group that is barred from this life and forced into an
inferior life of its own." 91 Black's crucial move is to connect the
public culture of state-mandated segregation to the political culture
of American constitutional democracy.
The thought train that propels Black's analysis in
"Lawfulness" starts from the idea that "the chief and all-dominating
purpose" of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
"was to ensure equal protection for the Negro." 92 Black is willing to
concede that those who wrote and ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment may have intended the "equal protection" concept to
"go forth into wider fields than the racial."93 What he refuses to
concede, not least "because history puts it entirely out of doubt" is
that "[all]
possible arguments, however convincing, for
discriminating against the Negro, were finally rejected by the
fourteenth amendment." 94
The combination of this historical train of thought with the
argument that segregation's purpose is not merely to "discriminate"
against African Americans but to keep them "in an inferior station"
yields an important normative insight into the notion of "equal
protection." The idea in question emerges toward the end of the
essay. Discussing Wechsler's contention that Brown was a case about
freedom of association, Black writes:
The fourteenth amendment forbids inequality, forbids
the disadvantaging of the Negro race by law. It was
surely anticipated that the following of this directive
would entail some disagreeableness for some white
southerners. The disagreeableness might take many
forms; the white man, for example, might dislike having
a Negro neighbor in the exercise of the latter's equal
right to own a home, or dislike serving on a jury with a
Negro, or dislike having Negroes on the streets with
him after ten o'clock. When the directive of equality
cannot be followed without displeasing the white, then
something that can be called a "freedom" of the white
90 Id.
91 Id.
92

Id. at 423.

93 Id.
94 Id.
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must be impaired.
If the fourteenth amendment
commands equality, and if segregation violates equality,
then the status of the reciprocal "freedom" is
automatically settled.95
Although Black is not entirely explicit on this score, as I
read it, the normative gist of the argument here appears to be that
the Fourteenth Amendment supports, and may even require courts
to develop what one might term a "preferential" racial equality
jurisprudence. In this vision of the equal protection idea, a judge
deciding a dispute involving competing claims of associational
freedom would start from the premise that the Fourteenth
Amendment's equality norm does not command "neutrality" in
Wechsler's sense. To the contrary, the equal protection idea
embodies a distinct "preference" in favor of "black" freedom-it
takes sides.

Obviously, this is a potentially paradigm shifting approach
to the law of the Fourteenth Amendment. If the Equal Protection
Clause represents a constitutional taking of sides in favor of African
Americans, an interpretive interest in the question of what
segregation and segregation law look like from the vantage point of
"the minority against whom it is directed" (as Wechsler put it)
would not be vulnerable to attack for recognizing the differences in
identity and interests between "a Negro" and "a segregadonist."9 6
The normative foundations of the equal protection principle itself
would provide a principled warrant for a judge to conclude that the
Constitution "prefers" (in Black's textual image) "the Negroes'
desire for merged participation in public life to the white man's
desire to live a public life without Negroes in proximity."97
I have been suggesting that one can read Black's account of
how he would address the constitutionality of state-mandated racial
segregation under an associational interests theory as presenting
important elements of a case against the very idea of "neutral
principles." However, I want to be clear about the precise claim I
am not making. The reading being pursued here is a reading based
on the "textual arguments" advanced in Black's writing,which do not
always converge with, and indeed at significant points in the essay,
conflict with its "propositional" arguments, as well as with other
"textual" arguments.
Id. at 429 (footnote omitted).
Wechsler, supranote 13, at 12.
97 Black, Lawfulness of Segregation Decisions, supranote 1, at 428.
9s

96
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One such divergent moment occurs toward the end of the
essay, in an argument that runs through and alongside the
lineaments of Black's "preferential" theory of the equal protection
principle. What particularly interests me here is the way in which
the terms of its textual argument are not completely consonant with
the rest of essay's full-throated defense of the "lawfulness" of the
segregation decisions:
[It]

would be the most unneutral of principles,
improvised ad hoc, to require that a court faced with the
present problem refuse to note a plain fact about the
society of the United States-the fact that the social
meaning of segregation is the putting of the Negro in a
position of walled-off inferiority-or the other equally
plain fact that such treatment is hurtful to human
beings. Southern courts, on the basis of just such a
judgment, have held that the placing of a white person
in a Negro railroad car is an actionable humiliation;
must a court pretend not to know that the Negro's
situation there is humiliating?98
These lines mark the moment in Black's text when he comes
closest to contesting the hegemony of the "neutral principles" idea,
and to confronting head on its pretensions to be the only "genuinely
principled" normative baseline for arguing about the constitutional
law of racial equality.
For all its forcefulness, however, the language here has a
halting quality, as though it were hesitant to spell out the full
consequences of its formulations. At least two ideas might be said
to flow from Black's argument in this passage, neither of which gets
stated explicitly. First, Black could have chosen to declare flat out
that "neutral principles" theory was not neutral, but normative,
substantive in ways that its fetishism of process tended to mask.9 9
Second, Black could have offered an open and unapologetic defense
of an "anti-neutral principles" theory of the segregation decisions,
along the lines I have just discussed. Instead, the essay retreats to a
rhetorical language of irony, intimation, innuendo and indirection,
beginning with the oratio obliqua, "It would be the most unneutral
of principles," and ending with the "rhetorical question" or
erotema, "Must a court pretend not to know?" The most striking
feature of the writing here is the way it strains to avoid openly stating
98

Id. at 427.

99 Gary Peller makes a compelling case on this count. See Peller, supra
note 61, at 612-13.
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the conclusion toward which its argument seemed to be heading.
On the evidence of what I have been calling the essay's textual
argument, it would seem that the normative "law" of "neutral
principles"-its sheer taken-for-grantedness-retains a hold even
on the powerful critical imagination of Charles Black.
My contention here is that the text of "The Lawfulness of
the Segregation Decisions" fails fully or finally to break the
discursive grip of the "neutral principles" idea.100 In Brown, the
Supreme Court famously hesitated when given the opportunity to
explicitly overrule Plessy v. Ferguson, saying only: "We conclude that
in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal'
has no place."101 In a mimetic nod to the formulation of the Brown
Court, Charles Black stops short of expressly rejecting the claims of
"neutral principles," writing simply: "Elegantiajuris and conceptual
algebra have here no place."1 02
Given the relatively private context in which it was
produced and consumed, written academic discourse of the kind
practiced by intellectuals such as Charles Black was by its very
nature an inadequate medium for doing the necessary cultural work
to create a broad public constituency that could be mobilized behind
a "preferential" vision of racial equality jurisprudence. Over the
course of the decade that began with the publication of "The
Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions," the task of imagining and
defending a black "liberation jurisprudence" (of which the
Fourteenth Amendment equality norm was only one part) would be
taken up by a black freedom movement whose central ambition was to
achieve and exercise full democratic citizenship. In this movement,
practices of public culture and practices of public freedom were
intimately connected. Animated by a shared interest in the possible
uses of law as a tool for social change, this movement imagined and
enacted a vision of American constitutional democracy which could
be considered a secular analog of a social justice theory whose most
extended theoretical articulation during the decade took place
among members of religious communities. This is the notion,
100Black was not alone in his inability to think his way past the
intellectual dominance of the "neutral principles" idea. Writing a full twenty
years later, Derrick Bell framed his celebrated "interest convergence thesis" as
a descriptive account or "positivistic expression of the neutral statement of
general applicability sought by Professor Wechsler." Bell, supra note 1, at 523.
101 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
102 Black, Lawfulness of Segregation Decisions, supranote 1, at 429.
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associated with Christian liberation theology, of a "preferential
option for the oppressed." 03
A crucial early event in the history of this movement of
"enacted constitutional jurisprudence" took place just one month
after the publication of "The Lawfulness of the Segregation
Decisions." On February 1, 1960, four young African American
men, students at the predominantly black North Carolina
Agricultural and Technical State College, walked into the
Greensboro, North Carolina F.W. Woolworth and sat down at the
store's "Whites Only" lunch counter. Within weeks, the sit-in
campaign launched by Ezell Blair, Jr., Franklin McCain, Joseph
NcNeil and David Richmond had galvanized the imagination of
other college students, professors, social service professionals,
primary and secondary school teachers, and clergy on both sides of
the color line.104
The sit-in movement, of course, was about much more than
the right to order and enjoy a meal or a milkshake. Several points
might be made about the sit-in movement and its contribution to
the creation of an "enacted constitutional jurisprudence." I shall
briefly mention two that bear most directly on the instant
discussion. First, and most obviously, the sit-in movement was a
public movement because it took place in public. The "publicness"
of the movement did not turn on the formal legal status of the F.W.
Woolworth Company, which was, after all, a private business
corporation. Nor did it depend on the character of the formal
activity that took place within the venue-the buying and selling of
goods and services by market actors. What made the lunch counter
at Woolworth public was the way black sit-in participants and their
allies turned it into a "social stage" on which to "publicize," and in
publicizing, to contest, unmarked, unexamined and unjust white skin
privilege and power.
In this respect, the sit-in movement represented a marked
departure from the boycotts of the 1950's. The essential gesture of
103This formulation was made popular by the father of liberation
theology, the Dominican priest and theologian Gustavo Gutierrez. See
GUSTAVO GUTItRREZ, A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION: HISTORY, POLITICS,
AND SALVATION (1973). The most influential effort to develop a liberation
theology rooted in the experience of African Americans is the body of work
produced by James H. Cone. See JAMES H. CONE, BLACK THEOLOGY AND
BLACK POWER (1969); JAMES H. CONE, A BLACK THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION
(1970).
104 Marion A. Wright, The Sit-In Movement. Progress Report and Prognoses,
9 WAYNE L. REV. 445 (1963).
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the civil rights boycott was a "withdrawal" from public life.
Consider, in this connection, the 1955-1956 Montgomery, Alabama
bus boycott. 105 The organized response of Montgomery's black
citizens to the indignities of segregated bus service was to stay off
the buses, which they did for some 382 days, while creating an
alternative, informal transportation network of privately-owned and
operated vehicles. 106 The organizers of the lunch counter sit-ins
decided on a different, and in many ways more provocative, direct
action campaign.
Instead of boycotting the Greensboro
Woolworth, they flooded the store, appearing most days in
sufficient numbers to occupy every available seat at the lunch
counter. Sit-in activists in Greensboro and the other towns and
cities in which sit-ins were staged sought to end segregated food
service by actively and publicly interrupting it, instead of privately
and more passively boycotting it.
Most Southern whites undoubtedly viewed their right of
access to public lunch counters and diners as a personal and prepolitical right, with no connection to or consequences for public life
or public freedom. Moreover, the majority of Southern whites
probably took it for granted that, like all places of "public
accommodation" in the segregated South, non-whites who were
allowed to enter venues such as Woolworth did so on the terms and
subject to the conditions that white people laid down. In short,
African Americans in the South had no public life that was not
subject to the actual or potential control of whites through the rules
of segregation. This racial prerogative of white private power in
and over public space not only straddled the boundaries between
public and private; it ran beneath, before and beyond formally
instituted politics and law. By "custom," its terms and conditions
could be changed at any time by white people as a group, or for that
matter, by any individual white person.
White cultural dominion involved much more than the power
to exclude; it extended even to the definitional power to determine
which people, places or things were public or private and which
were not. The nature and scope of this dominionative power is partly
but not fully captured by Cheryl I. Harris' rich and important notion
of "whiteness as property."10 7 The cultural prerogatives of whites
within the system of state-enforced segregation went far beyond the
105Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King's Constitution: A Legal HistoU

of the Bus Boycott, 98 YALE. L.J. 999 (1989).
106
107

(1993).

Id. at 1022.
Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707
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rights of "racial exclusion."108 The rights of white cultural dominion
of course included the power to "make up people" 109 by deciding
who was white, who was black, and who was not; but they also
included the broader prerogative to "make up" the world.
The four young students who entered Greensboro's
Woolworth store that first day in February 1960 were asserting the
right of African Americans to be "public" men and women, to be
"subjects" in the world of the cultural commons. As Marion A.
Wright put it, the sit-ins "[sprang] from a firm resolve to exercisefu//
rights as American citizens," 110 including the rights of cultural
citizenship.
In introducing the idea of the "rights of cultural
citizenship," I mean to signal the ways in which the demand by
black students and their white allies for desegregated lunch counter
service was a demand for recognition of their right to a "democratic
public culture."111 The "right to participate in the cultural life of the
community" 112 is a necessary precondition for acquiring the
"cultural capital" required for effective participation in the
institutions and practices of formal democracy.11 3 By taking their
protests inside the social space of the segregated public sphere, black
sit-in activists and their allies actively contested the social meaning
that identified white southerners with public culture, public presence
and public personhood-at the point of its production. Furthermore,
the public setting of their protests not only gave sit-in participants a
stage on which to "enact" the denial of cultural citizenship under
segregation; the publicness of the sit-ins also provided a platform on
which movement activists could prefiguratively "perform" the
democratic rights and duties that would be theirs in the multicultural
democracy for which they were fighting.
A second observation to be made about the sit-in
movement is that the participants in the movement not only acted in
public, but acted as a public. The four young men who staged the
108 Id. at

1737.

109Ian
Hacking, Making Up People, in RECONSTRUCTING
INDIVIDUALISM: AUTONOMY, INDIVIDUALITY, AND THE SELF IN WESTERN
THOUGHT 222 (Thomas C. Heller et al. eds., 1986).

110Wright, supranote 104, at 447.
'1' Robert C. Post, Introduction:After Bakke, 55 REPRESENTATIONS 1,
7 (1996).
112 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/
en/documents/udhr.
113 Post, supra note 111, at 8-9.
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first sit-in in Greensboro acted in concert. They were not, in Thomas
Keenan's words, "a collection of private individuals experiencing
their commonality." 114 Like the thousands of other activists who
eventually joined them, the North Carolina A&T students who
staged that first sit-in acted after weeks and months of extended
discussion as members of a national black public. They found
individual motivation and meaning in a shared understanding of
their exclusion as black citizens from the public life of the
communities where they studied, and from which they came.
Central to this understanding was a shared intuition about
the damage segregation imposed on democratic public culture in the
United States. The sit-in activists knew that the public realm is a
"realm . . . of others, of all that is other to-and in-the subject
itself.""15 The color line that separated black and white public
cultures denied all American citizens the opportunity to
communicate across "the identity and assumptions" that defined the
"distinctive communities" to which they belonged.116 Segregation
deprived American democracy of one of the chief benefits of a
common public culture, which is to "tearH us from ourselves,
expose[] us to and involve[] us with others."" 7 The sit-ins enacted a
"nonneutral principle" of constitutional law.
This principle
demanded not equal, but preferential concern and respect for the
excluded or marginalized civic other.
The 1960 sit-ins very quickly gave birth to an organized
movement whose most important incarnation was the Student NonViolent Coordinating Committee, better known as SNCC. 118 This
movement, "led by youngsters,"1 19 marked a fundamental
transformation in the Black American public sphere, not least
because it challenged the historical dominance of the generation of
an older, more organized, and more accommodationist Black
leadership.
SNCC was the most institutionally developed
articulation in 1960's Black America of an alternative public of the
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118 Among the most insightful histories of the Student Non-Violent
Coordinating Committee are HOWARD ZINN, SNCC: THE NEW
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kind to which Nancy Fraser has given the name "subaltern
counterpublic," 120 a "parallel" discursive arena "where members of
subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses to
formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests,
and needs." 121
As Clayborne Carson has noted, the "forms of racial
consciousness that arose in SNCC during the mid-1960s were
archetypes for the ideas that would later emerge in the women's
liberation and other identity movements." 122
It was in the
experiential crucible of racial "consciousness" and racial "identity"
that young Black college and university student activists of the
1960's helped forge interpretive tools and build civic institutions for
advancing the emerging project that I have called here African
American "liberation" jurisprudence.
Herbert Marcuse once famously wrote that the "restoration
of remembrance to its rights, as a vehicle for liberation, is one of the
noblest tasks of thought." 123 A great distance separates us from the
America of the sit-in movement, and from the America about which
Charles Black, Jr. wrote in "The Lawfulness of the Segregation
Decisions." Race and racism today are not what they were in 1960.
Nonetheless, the spectral "fear of a Black public" 124-or of a Black
president-has not been completely exorcised from the U.S. body
politic. The volume you now hold in your hand or perhaps read on
your iPad bears within it the sedimented history and the accreted
knowledge of that period in our national life. As you read the
contributions to this inaugural issue of the Columbia Journal of Race
and Law, I hope you will find yourself as excited as I am about the
insights they offer into the role law and legal scholarship might play
in "writing the future" 125 of racial justice.
120 Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the
Critique ofActually Existing Democracy, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE
109, 123 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1992).
121 Id. at 123.
122 CARSON, supra note 118, at 2.

123HERBERT

MARCUSE,

EROS

AND

CIVILIZATION:

A

PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO FREUD 232 (1966).

I riff here on the title of the classic 1990 recording by the
American hip hop group Public Enemy. See PUBLIC ENEMY, FEAR OF A
BLACK PLANET (Def Jam Recordings 1990).
125 This phrase is taken from the title of the recent Nike video
campaign for the 2010 FIFA World Cup, directed by filmmaker Alejandro
Gonzalez Infidrritu. See Write the Future (Nike, Inc. 2010), available at http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=lSggaxXUSSk (last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
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